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The Geopolitics of Neighbourhood: Jerusalem’s
Colonial Space Revisited
HAIM YACOBI
Department of Politics and Government, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev,
Beer Sheba, Israel
WENDY PULLAN
Department of Architecture, University of Cambridge, UK
This article will focus on an ongoing process of Jerusalem’s
contested urban space during the last decade namely the
immigration of Palestinians, mostly Israeli citizens, to “satellite
neighbourhoods”, i.e. Jerusalem’s colonial neighbourhoods that
were constructed after 1967. Theoretically, this paper attempts
to discuss neighbourhood planning in contested cities within the
framework of geopolitics. In more details, we will focus on the rel-
evance of geopolitics to the study of neighbourhood planning, by
which we mean not merely a discussion of international relations
and conflict or of the roles of military acts and wars in producing
space. Rather, geopolitics refers to the emergence of discourses and
forces connected with the technologies of control, patterns of inter-
nal migrations by individuals and communities, and the flow of
cultures and capital.
INTRODUCTION
Yocheved: They arrived, Yoske.
Yoske: Who arrived?
Yocheved: The Arabs.
. . .
Yocheved: Look, now he is fighting with a policeman. I am afraid that it
is just the beginning. You know, people say that the first one arrives, and
then another one and another one. At the end we will find ourselves a
minority here. Yoskale, what will we do?1
Address correspondence to Haim Yacobi, Department of Politics and Government, Ben-
Gurion University of the Negev, Beer Sheba, 84105 Israel. E-mail: yacobih@bgu.ac.il
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2 Haim Yacobi and Wendy Pullan
The above dialogue is taken from ‘Avoda Aravit’ (Arab Labour), a new TV
series, written by Sayed Keshua, a Palestinian Arab and an Israeli citizen.
In this dialogue Yocheved and Yoske, a ‘typical’ middle-class liberal Israeli
couple, suspiciously watch their new neighbour, Amjad, a Palestinian jour-
nalist, who is moving into ‘their’ Jewish neighbourhood in West Jerusalem.
Keshua was born and grew up in the Arab town of Tira (within the green
line, the 1948 borders of Israel). As a student, he moved to Jerusalem and
after several years of living in the city in the Palestinian neighbourhood of
Beit Safafa, decided to move with his family to one of the upper middle-class
Jewish neighbourhoods in West Jerusalem. There, he and his family were the
first, and probably the only, Palestinians.
Kashua’s successful TV series cynically describes the crossing of social,
cultural and spatial boundaries in a Jerusalem proclaimed by Israel as
‘unified’. One important feature of the sitcom describes an ongoing pro-
cess in the contested city during the last decade, namely the immigration
of Palestinians, many of them Israeli citizens, to Jewish neighbourhoods.
According to the available data2 about 7,200 Palestinians lived in Jewish
neighbourhoods of Jerusalem at the end of 2008 (the majority are Israeli citi-
zens), of which approximately 4,500 live in what are described by Israelis as
satellite neighbourhoods, i.e., Jerusalem’s settlements that were constructed
after 1967 on land captured from Jordan – today considered by international
bodies to be Palestinian; the Palestinians refer to them as colonies. It is worth
pointing out the percentages of non-Jewish residents in French Hill are rel-
atively high when compared to other settlements such as Pisgat Zeev, Neve
Yaakov and Gilo.
Despite the colonial status of these sites and the attempt to reserve
them for Israeli Jews only, Abowd3 suggests that they offer urban services
and goods that make them attractive for many Palestinians ‘whose options in
Arab neighbourhoods are not uncommonly more expensive and difficult to
access’. To this it is worth adding that good quality housing in East Jerusalem
is in short supply.4 Indeed, though quantitatively the data we noted above
might be considered a marginal phenomenon,5 qualitatively, we suggest it
is significant for Jerusalem, a highly segregated city, and more generally for
the study of ethnically mixed cities in Israel.
‘Mixed cities’ is a term widely used in Israel to describe situations in
which Jewish and Palestinian communities occupy the same urban territory;
four main types can be identified. The first refers to cities such as Haifa,
where Jews and Arabs lived under the same municipality prior to the estab-
lishment of the State of Israel in 1948. The second category includes cities
such as Lydda, Ramla, Acre, and Jaffa that were Palestinian prior to 1948 and
that became dominated by a Jewish majority after the establishment of the
State.6 The third category refers to new Jewish-Israeli towns, such as Carmiel
and Upper Nazareth, that were established after 1948 as an attempt to Judaise
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Jerusalem’s Colonial Space Revisited 3
the space of the State of Israel and have accommodated Palestinian migration
during the last three decades.7 Finally, the case of post-1967 Jerusalem con-
stitutes an additional typology that forms the central concern of this article.
Post-1967 Jerusalem, that emerged out of war, is also an example of a Jewish-
Arab ‘mixed city’ although it is more commonly referred to as divided or
contested, in terms of its urban space and ethno-national lines, and within a
colonial context, its Palestinian areas are occupied by Israel.8
From a theoretical point of view, we attempt to discuss neighbourhood
planning in contested cities within the growing literature on geopolitics.
As Nagel9 states, despite the relevance of this body of knowledge, there
is a tendency in the literature to treat geopolitics as a detached topic of study
from other social phenomena such as migration and urbanism. This criticism
is echoed in Newman’s10 proposal that the impact of borders and territorial-
ity is not diminishing; rather, new scales of territorial affiliations and borders
are recognisable that may be flexible but are still selective on different geo-
graphical scales, an argument that paves the road for reading neighbourhood
planning geopolitically.
This article departs from much of the more well-known treatment of
geopolitics because it focuses on the relevance of geopolitical analysis of
contested urban neighbourhoods, by which we mean not solely a discussion
of international relations and conflict or the role of military acts and wars
to the production of space, but the effects of geopolitical events upon the
practices of everyday urban life.11 We suggest that geopolitics refers to the
emergence of discourses and forces attached to technologies of control, pat-
terns of internal migrations in colonial context, as well as the flow of cultures
and capital.12 This has effect at urban and neighbourhood scales and can be
assessed, at least to some extent, as part of urban phenomena. Furthermore,
this article is located within the field of critical geopolitics, which has sought
to challenge the universalist claims of traditional geopolitics that look at
borders of a post-Westphalian world that has interpreted global-scale shifts
as those running beyond dividing lines. Such perspectives look at divisions
as more deep-seated socio-political partitions, and critical readings that are
offered by several scholars13 seek to redefine the concept of division and
control by understanding power structures at both the global and local
scales. Following this argument, in the context of this article, geopolitics
will be used as an analytical tool for studying the flow of people and capi-
tal that subverts the spatio-political distinctions in colonial urban space that
are habitually taken for granted in political geography.14 A relevant example
of such perspective is presented by Graham,15 which analyses the migra-
tion of ethnic, national and racial communities into cities and the emerging
urban divisions and spatial configurations that are far beyond the scope of
their respective nation-states. Graham’s critical analysis refers to some of the
weakening territorial-urban control of the state and the production of social
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4 Haim Yacobi and Wendy Pullan
clashes such as the uprisings in the French cities in late 2005. These internal
colonies, argues Graham, may resonate with anti-colonial ambitions in our
own cities.16
Following the above discussion, we further suggest that the critical
body of geopolitics should be located within the growing academic writing
on planning, architecture, and cities, which throughout their histories have
been socio-political arenas where different classes, ethnic groups, migrants,
and strangers interact.17 Such an approach is presented by several scholars18
who analyse the ways in which public planning in Israel has been striving
dramatically to influence the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in order to achieve
geopolitical ends. In some detail, these scholars suggest that the strategy of
planning in Jerusalem has been based on geopolitical strategies, aiming to
control demography, to expand the jurisdiction of the city through confisca-
tion of Palestinian lands and to exclude the Palestinian inhabitants of the city
from any strategic planning for the city.
While such critical analysis of Israeli planning is a tool to achieve macro-
territorial national goals, in this article we consider further exploration of
the relationships between planning and geopolitics by suggesting that the
geopolitics of neighbourhoods have to do with a crossing of scales; this
works from the neighbourhood to the city and then to the colonial appa-
ratuses of the state, as well as in the other direction from the macro to
the micro. Important to our argument is the fact that these socio-spatial
dynamics – whether supportive of or resistant to the state’s or municipal-
ity’s planning policies – take place in a very concrete way and are used by
individuals and communities.
Our focus on neighbourhood scale is far from arbitrary. Rather, the con-
cept of neighbourhood, as a social and spatial entity, is discursively linked
to modernity, modern planning and certainly nationalism.19 Since the end of
the nineteenth century, the design of modern neighbourhoods was at the
core of urban planning; its vision was not only the physical improvement
of housing conditions but extended to civitas, i.e., the shared community of
citizens.20 Yet, Western planning ideologies, especially in colonial contexts,
inherently embody cultural imperialism, and thus present a utopian idiom of
neighbourhood which is based on a homogenous social entity; against such
a background, a community where its dwellers are strangers to each other is
thus rendered problematic. In other words, there is a hegemonic assumption
behind colonial planning, and a sense of community is taken to refer to the
same ethnic, national, racial or class group.
Based on extensive fieldwork carried out from January 2006 to July
2013 which included documentation, quantitative data collection, archival
research as well as in-depth interviews,21 this article focuses on French Hill,
the neighbourhood that was the first settlement of the Israeli Judaisation
of East Jerusalem. Israelis consider it to be politically and culturally part of
unified Jerusalem. Established according to modern planning episteme, this
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Jerusalem’s Colonial Space Revisited 5
neighbourhood is inhabited by Jewish residents, but as noted, it is undergo-
ing a process of demographic transformation as Palestinians, both with Israeli
citizenship and Jerusalem Resident Certificates, have been moving there in
recent years.
Indeed, as we will detail, despite the escalating violence following the
First and especially the Second Intifada,22 and the ongoing discourses of
enmity, Israeli residents in French Hill found themselves facing a dilemma:
‘to sell or not to sell’, using Rabinowitz’s words,23 property to Palestinians.
While such a dilemma has been explored by several studies in relation to
Jewish-Arab mixed cities,24 we suggest that the case of French Hill may
exhibit some differences to areas inside Israel. For if we consider the matter
in terms of Palestinian sensibilities, the question of ‘to buy or not to buy’
property becomes one of existential concern, as French Hill is one of the first
settlements built on occupied Palestinian land in East Jerusalem, as well as
a neighbourhood ostensibly built for, and offering public services to, Jewish
residents only.
NEW COLONIALISM: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MODERN
NEIGHBOURHOOD
As widely documented and analysed, a significant spatial turning point in
Israel’s geopolitical conditions started after June 1967 when Israel occupied
East Jerusalem, as well as other territories.25 Following this, the Israeli gov-
ernment unilaterally annexed all of East Jerusalem, expanded the municipal
boundaries on Palestinian territory, and applied Israeli law to all of the city
(although in most cases, not to its Palestinian citizens). These measures were
taken despite international objection and lack of recognition. Yet, beyond
Israeli rhetoric representing Jerusalem as a unified city, the planning poli-
cies have contributed to the paradigm of a colonial city. Both state and
city pursue these policies,26 which have persistently promoted a project of
Judaisation: the expansion of Jewish political, territorial, demographic, and
economic control to all parts of the city. This has been explicitly manifested
by Israeli leaders, including David Ben Gurion, whose revealing words were
uttered a few days after the end of the 1967 war:
Jews should be brought to East Jerusalem at any cost. Thousands of
Jews should settle soon. Jews will agree to settle in East Jerusalem,
even in shacks. We should not wait for the construction of proper
neighbourhoods. The most important thing is that there will be there
Jews.27
Israel has used its military might and economic power to relocate bor-
ders and boundaries, grant and deny rights and resources, shift populations,
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6 Haim Yacobi and Wendy Pullan
and reshape the occupied territories for the purpose of ensuring Jewish
control. In the case of East Jerusalem, two complementary strategies have
been implemented by Israel; the massive construction of an outer ring of
Jewish neighbourhoods (including French Hill) which now hosts over half
the Jewish population of Jerusalem, and the containment of Palestinian
development, implemented through housing demolition, the limited issu-
ing of building permits, the establishment of national parks along the
edges of areas of Palestinian habitation, and the prevention of immigra-
tion to the city. Land use policy in Jerusalem encourages Jewish expansion
while restraining Palestinian growth. Prior to 1948 Jews owned less than
30 percent of the property within the municipality of Jerusalem; nowadays,
Jewish ownership and control of property accounts for over 90 percent
of Jerusalem.28 Furthermore, Israelis have also maintained control of most
infrastructures, even those that are Palestinian such as major access roads, so
that Palestinians have become isolated in their own neighbourhoods, cut off
from each other as well as from Israelis.29
It is within the above geo-strategic logic that an analysis of the French
Hill colonial planning and design should be understood. Let us start by
suggesting that despite the fact that the colonisation of East Jerusalem was
declared in a government decision from 12 May 1968, it is the professional
knowledge of experts that contributed to the implementation of such pol-
icy. The first step was the use of the legal system; in January 1968 the Land
Ordinance for expropriating land through the Planning and Construction
Law 1965 was invoked. This allowed the expropriation of land for public
use without any specified use, whether for housing, parks or infrastruc-
ture. As a result of this act, 3345 dunams30 were expropriated in the first
instance, including the area to become French Hill. Levi Eshkol, the Israeli
Prime Minister at that time, nominated Yehuda Tamir, to be in charge of the
Jewish settlement project in East Jerusalem.31 In order to avoid any delay or
objections on planning ground, Tamir was working under the direct admin-
istrative responsibility of the Prime Minister’s office rather than the Ministry
of Housing or the Ministry of Interior. In the face of international pressure
on Israel to stop the expropriation of occupied land, Tamir understood that
it would be crucial to prioritise the steps towards the colonisation of East
Jerusalem; settlements in the northern part of ‘unified Jerusalem’, including
French Hill, were the first.32
While the case of French Hill illustrates a geo-strategic approach, it
also stands at a critical topographical point for the newly expanded Israeli
Jerusalem. From it, there is a visual axis to the Old City, while at the same
time, the neighbourhood pivots between the main road to the northern West
Bank and to the south, East Jerusalem. It is also on the road that con-
nects Mount Scopus, and its Hebrew University campus, with Israeli West
Jerusalem. The connections help to reinforce an Israeli weak spot from
the divided topography of 1948–1967 and point towards future settlement.
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Jerusalem’s Colonial Space Revisited 7
FIGURE 1 North East Jerusalem area – a general view from North East.
Certainly, the location of Jerusalem’s new neighbourhoods, including French
Hill, did not depend upon the availability of land or planning logic, but
rather as noted by former Israeli City Engineer (1992–1994), Elinoar Barzaki,
‘it was a clear political agenda to re-shape the city’s boundaries’.33
The initial demographic objective for French Hill was designed to house
2,400 Jewish families. This number increased later due to a decision to
allocate thirty-seven dunams to the expansion of the Hebrew University
Campus.34 Public buildings such as schools and kindergartens were located
on the East slope of the hill, protected from the western wind, and the
housing zones were designed around the hill top. In the spirit of modern
neighbourhood planning at the time, the design scheme proposed the sep-
aration of cars from pedestrians, while most of the housing blocks were
planned as four-storey buildings. At the time, many of the planning decision
reflected a cutting edge approach to modern housing.
In December 1969, the Rogers’ Plan (after US Secretary of State William
Rogers) was published, calling for a shared administration of the city by
representatives of the three main religions. Such a recommendation was
rejected by the Israeli authorities and as a result the aspirations for low-
rise housing in French Hill were pushed aside and three to four additional
floors were added to each building in order to intensify the Jewish pres-
ence in East Jerusalem. Here the inclusion of architecture and planning as
part of the geopolitical tool-box is essential; even more than most other cul-
tural representations, buildings are the manifestation of the political power
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8 Haim Yacobi and Wendy Pullan
of the state. In the case of French Hill, housing was a key player, and the
geopolitical effect of modern architecture and planning has had to do with
the ability to produce not only a tangible manifestation in territory, but also
‘new forms of collective association, personal habit and daily life’.35 This is
noticeable in the planning outline of French Hill where the south-west side
of the neighbourhood was left vacant in order to enable a gaze towards
the Old City and the Temple Mount. The attempt to create a visual axis
between the frontier new settlement and the historical centre of Jerusalem’s
Old City contributed to the symbolic construction of the settlement being
part of ‘united Jerusalem’. Such techniques formed components of wider dis-
course and practices that characterised Israeli architecture and planning after
1967. The unilateral reunification of Jerusalem challenged Israeli architects
and planners who immediately after the 1967 war, were asked ‘to cover the
recently occupied land with built facts on the ground in order to foster the
desired unity of the city under Israeli rule’.36
The architectural response to this challenge was expressed in designing
the new neighbourhoods not so much as unadulterated modern buildings
but within a Middle Eastern stylistic vernacular of arched windows, rusticated
stone and stepped houses. Significantly, such an orientalist interpretation
uses its architectural scale and forms as a means of symbolically appro-
priating the Palestinian built landscape. A telling illustration of this trend
is expressed in the design outline of Tzameret Habira (Figure 2), a hous-
ing compound built on the eastern slope of French Hill, facing the Judean
FIGURE 2 Tzameret Habira selling brochure.
Source: Jerusalem Municipality archive.
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Jerusalem’s Colonial Space Revisited 9
Desert and the Palestinian village of Issawiya. This part of French Hill was
designed to form low terraces that hug the hillside in a way that emulates the
architecture of Palestinian villages. The project houses mainly Jewish immi-
grants from the US, Canada and Western Europe and was considered the
most luxurious zone of the neighbourhood:
All housing will be built in one or two storey units. These are designed
so that all houses have uninterrupted views. . . . The general architecture
will be Mediterranean in character and the overall effect should be that
given from afar by the typical Arab village which is built inconspicuously
into the hills.37
The so-called Arab village in the above description is portrayed as
natural; it becomes a de-politicised and a-historical object that responds
to the local topography in good taste, and is seen only from a distance.
Nevertheless, this discursive appropriation is none other than a purification
process based on mimicry which occurs in the colonial arena of those in
power, the professionals, who desire to create an oriental landscape as a
mechanism of symbolic indigenisation of the settlers. This approach, we
suggest, has been a mechanism of constructing the Jewish inhabitants’ sense
of place, as noted in one of the interviews:
When we came to live here, the view from the window was empty –
there was no one there – maybe a house or two. The kids used to play in
the valley. Today, you see, there are all these illegal [Palestinian] houses
in front of us.38
As mentioned, the attempt to colonise East Jerusalem was not just territo-
rial, but rather to create a new sense of belonging and superiority among
the Jerusalem (Jewish) inhabitants in their new neighbourhoods.39 Thus, for
example, special attention was given to the new street names that were
named after military events understood by Israelis to be heroic, such as:
Mavo Hamaavak (the Struggle Alley), the Partizan Alley, Mavo Hahitnadvut
(the Volunteering Alley, commemorating Jewish volunteers during World War
II), and HaEtzel and HaLehi Streets, recognising Jewish militant groups who
fought the British for independence in the late 1940s.40
To sum up this section, locating French Hill as the first colony after
the 1967 war to link West Jerusalem and the Hebrew University Campus on
Mount Scopus had a fundamental role in the process of the Israeli territoriali-
sation of the city. Geopolitically it marked the edges of the ‘unification’ of the
city post 1967, and through the planning apparatus produced a seemingly
natural and historically based frontier, which enabled the extensive devel-
opment of Jewish neighbourhoods on Palestinian expropriated land. By so
doing, a new cognitive map of a unified Jerusalem as the Jewish Capital was
produced that became credible in social and political terms for Israelis.
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10 Haim Yacobi and Wendy Pullan
A FRONTIER NEIGHBOURHOOD
The location of French Hill with its proximity to a number of Palestinian
areas, such as Issawiya and Shuafat, meant that total control or removal
of Palestinians in the Jewish neighbourhood would be difficult or impos-
sible. Both geographically and symbolically the frontier location of French
Hill is significant; it is geographically surrounded by contested landscapes,
today including a portion of the separation wall.41 It watches (and is indeed
watched by) Shuafat, the nearby Palestinian refugee camp, and it marks the
edge of the city as it is situated by the main road that leads to the Judaean
desert. Indeed, as argued by Pullan,42 studies of contested frontier zones
tend to focus on states or regions rather than cities, where, according to
Ron,43 the colonial frontier is conceived as a remote and radicalised region,
a resource of Terra Nullius. On the other hand, despite strict attempts to
command urban frontiers through controlling practices such as planning and
housing regulations, cities do not normally have the apparatus available to
states to control frontiers.44 The situation of French Hill is an example of
such an urban frontier. There, the increasing movement of Palestinians into
the neighbourhood is a result of the geopolitical conditions where Israeli
surveillance and control over East Jerusalem’s Palestinian neighbourhoods
cause unequal distribution of resources and infrastructure, poverty, social
and physical deterioration.
A closer view of daily activities reveals that Palestinian presence in the
neighbourhood is due to public services that are located there. For example,
the local commercial centre in HaEtzel Street serves not just Jewish inhab-
itants but also Palestinians from nearby neighbourhoods such as Issawiya,
Shuafat, Beit Hanina and Beit La’hiya as customers. The local branch of
HaPoalim Bank, in HaHagana Street serves both the Jewish and Arab popu-
lation, as does the post office in HaHail Street, and a car insurance agency
that is owned by a Palestinian. The unequal distribution of infrastructure and
services between West and East Jerusalem is indeed one of the main reasons
why Palestinians cross the border.45
The proximity of the French Hill neighbourhood to the Hebrew
University Campus attracts Palestinian students (the majority are Israeli citi-
zens) who rent accommodation in the neighbourhood. Sharing apartments is
very common, and there are some cases of mixed Palestinians and Israelis.
HaEtzel and Bar-Kochva streets are the most common areas for students, due
to their proximity to the University and because they are relatively cheap.
No formal Palestinian residency statistics exist, but from a survey of names on
mailboxes in these streets, we learned that the number of Palestinians living
in this area is stable. For example: at HaEtzel Street 17, out of twenty-four
apartments five of them had Arabic names written in Hebrew characters on
their mailboxes in 2005, with six Arabic names in 2010. At HaEtzel Street 16,
out of twenty-one apartments, four of them Arabic names written in Hebrew
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Jerusalem’s Colonial Space Revisited 11
MAP 1 Jerusalem’s built area of Israeli and Palestinian areas.
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12 Haim Yacobi and Wendy Pullan
characters in 2005 and two in 2010. At Bar-Kochva Street 16, out of twelve
apartments, one of them had an Arabic name written in Hebrew letters on
their mailbox and the same in 2010. The Palestinian students use all the
facilities in the area, including the bank, post office, supermarket and some
coffee shops.46 This is perceived as a threat by some Jewish residents:
I went to the café in the commercial centre; it was full of Arabs. I didn’t
feel comfortable and thus I asked for a take a way coffee . . . . We don’t
[want to] drink coffee in Ramallah. There is an economic interest for the
shops in the commercial centre and thus Arabs are there.47
Like other colonial cities, despite the spatio-political divisions along ethno-
national and racial lines,48 there is an ongoing flow of labour (in the
Jerusalem case, Palestinian workers) to the white neighbourhoods (in
Jerusalem, to French Hill and many other Jewish neighbourhoods). This was
observed as early as the beginning of the 1970s.49
From the early 2000s, during the escalating violence and tension
between Israel and the Palestinians, the frontier characteristics of the French
Hill area attracted some major Palestinian bombings and other attacks.50
Hence, the Palestinian presence in French Hill was heavily contested and
feared by many Israelis. One of these conflicts was around the presence of
Palestinian children and youth in a playground situated at the edge of the
neighbourhood that faced east towards their own village of Issawiya and was
far superior to any play area in their own vicinity. As a result of continued
protests by the Jewish residents of French Hill, the Jerusalem Municipality
removed most of the playground furniture in order to stop the Issawiya
children from coming to this playground. The displeasure of some of the
Jewish population in the neighbourhood over the use and/or appropriation
of space by Palestinians is expressed in the words of Uri Michaeli, the head
of the local municipality of the French Hill neighbourhood at that time:
Gan Hashlosha was built as a memorial for three soldiers who were killed
in Lebanon. No one has ever forbid Issawiya’s children from entering
the playground and they were welcomed at first, but in the last two
years the place has become a real bother. Issawiya’s children took over
the playground, drove out the Jewish children with threats and knives,
teased the adults and harass the girls. Whole families started coming to
the playground, although it has no sanitary facilities for so many visitors.
The children of French Hill stopped coming. The activity in the garden
lasted till late at night, with shouting and screaming, until many of the
neighbours seriously considered moving from their houses.51
Indeed, below the surface of the arguments presented above, there is an
additional layer, elusive but also significant, that is linked to the fear and anx-
iety associated with the presence of the Other. As the works of Sandercock52
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Jerusalem’s Colonial Space Revisited 13
and Bauman53 reveal, the fear of the Other is a central component in the
discourse of urban politics. Furthermore, the presence of fear in urban space
is not a simple reflection of social reality but rather itself a mechanism that
produces ‘reality’, one that is mediated through discourses of fear and order.
This is illustrated in the words of the head of the communal administration
of French Hill:
Tomorrow I will be asked to open an Arab school, and the day after to
build a mosque. Each person should live in his neighbourhood – as I do
not want to have Haredim [Orthodox Jews] here neither do I want Arabs
. . . I am afraid that French Hill will be occupied by Issawiya.54
Fear in its political dimension is intensified when the city undergoes
significant transformations that produce political discourse that is, in turn,
shaped by those that fear. To some extent, the presence of Palestinians
coming from the neighbouring Palestinian districts, as well as Palestinian
students renting apartments and using public space in French Hill is a good
example of the way in which the discourse of fear focuses on the ‘what
and whom’ we should be afraid of. For Israelis fear is mostly intermittent,
sometimes suppressed through their culture of occupation, but occasionally
made immediate and visible through challenges like the situation in French
Hill. Because they are under occupation, the fear of Palestinians could be
seen as more consistent and unbroken, but for them as well, French Hill
makes it clear and visible as they venture into ‘enemy’ territory with only
limited means of escape or relief. Important to both groups, and to our dis-
cussion here is the spatial dimension of fear, which ‘does not just involve a
relationship between the individual and a variety of societal structures; it is
embedded in a network of moral and political geographies’.55
STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL
It is important to reiterate the primary reason why most Palestinians have
moved to French Hill: they desire a better place to live. Homes and
neighbourhoods, with a good level of housing stock and neighbourhood ser-
vices, are generally denied to them in their own communities. But although
French Hill offers better physical accommodation, is it a better place to live?
This may be considered from two points of view, Israeli and Palestinians
in French Hill and the Israeli reaction to their inroads. With respect to the
latter, opposition has become more entrenched and more vocal. While the
presence of Palestinians in public spaces such as the French Hill commercial
centre and playground might be perceived by Jewish residents as a rela-
tively minor phenomenon that can be controlled, the permanent presence
of Palestinians who buy and rent property in the neighbourhood is a much
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14 Haim Yacobi and Wendy Pullan
more contested subject. There has been not only an institutionalised attempt
to severely limit Palestinians from living in property in areas designated for
Israeli habitation,56 but also an extensive public discourse intended to rein-
force the ban; for example, in September 2010, a public ‘Rabbis’ Letter’, called
for Jews not to let Arabs rent apartments in their communities. This decla-
ration states that anyone renting his apartment to an Arab is doing harm –
both in the eyes of God and for his fellow man.57
As far as Palestinians are concerned, the advantages and disadvantages
of living in French Hill are far more complex. The wider geopolitical con-
ditions with respect to the city of Jerusalem should also be noted here as
a central component in the explanation of this phenomenon. For many
years, the Israeli authorities have pursued a policy of limiting new hous-
ing in Palestinian areas of Jerusalem, and more recently, the demolition of
homes built without permits.58 For Palestinians who have the blue Jerusalem
residency ID card, living outside Jerusalem’s new borders endangers their
status as Jerusalemites,59 while for Palestinians with Israeli citizenship this
new reality complicates their mobility.60 Hence, after the construction of the
wall began, thousands of Palestinians returned to the city in order to protect
their residency status as well as some of their rights. As a result, there has
been an intensification of the housing shortage in East Jerusalem, with an
accompanying rapid increase in housing prices in of about 50 percent61 that
created pressure on the housing market. All of these factors have resulted
in some Palestinians with Jerusalem ID or Israeli citizenship, who have the
economic ability, moving into Jewish neighbourhoods.
This phenomenon reveals further complexities: Israeli Palestinians who
have a longer history of living near or next to Israelis and usually speak
fluent Hebrew tend to be more comfortable with such a move. Jerusalem
Palestinians, who may or may not speak good Hebrew and live under more
recent and harsh occupation, with pressure from their fellow Palestinians
to avoid fraternising with Israelis, are not. At the same time, it should be
noted that this is an upper middle-class practice; mortgages are generally
not available for such purchases by Palestinians, and cash payments are
the norm. Yet, although economic means makes the endeavour possible,
the potential for political pitfalls are evident in an interview with Mustafa,
a Palestinian who is an Israeli citizen, who moved to the French Hill in
2005:
In the year 2000 we almost bought a ‘villa’ in [Israeli] Pisgat Zeev. Then
the Second Intifada started, there was a tension and I knew that we could
not move to Pisgat Zeev . . . . So, we searched for a place we liked.
We did not want to live in [Palestinian] Shuafat; the municipal services,
schools and infrastructure are not good there. Because of the Intifada,
there is often a flying checkpoint at the entrance to Shuafat, and if they
stop you, you cannot get to work on time in the city.62
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Jerusalem’s Colonial Space Revisited 15
Mustafa notes that French Hill is close to some of the Palestinian commer-
cial and social centres such as Sheikh Jarrah, Wadi Joz, Beit Hanina and the
main road to Ramallah, thus enabling contact with the Palestinian side, while
on the other hand his family can enjoy ‘modern infrastructure, municipal ser-
vices. Here there is security and sovereignty, it is not abandoned’.63 These, as
well as nearby Shuafat, are mostly middle-class Palestinian neighbourhoods
supplying shops and services appropriate to their residents. The geopolitics
of the situation is tempered by specific needs and familiar practices.
Palestinians who wish to buy a property in the French Hill must
negotiate with Jewish estate agents or deal directly with individual Jewish
vendors who will often maximise their material gain in selling property to
Palestinians. In some cases they are very reluctant to sell to Palestinians. This
issue was raised by Antuan, a Christian-Palestinian lawyer, and an Israeli
citizen who is married to a Jerusalem Palestinian. Antuan bought his apart-
ment in 2002; it was during the Second Intifada and a spate of attacks and
the killing of Israelis in the French Hill area that the housing process was
brought down. Despite the relatively low housing prices at that time, Antuan
mentioned that some of the Israeli sellers refused to sell their apartments to
Palestinians.64
Indeed, the discussion of the politics of “free market” dynamic vis-a-vis
ethnic and racial exclusion is well-known in the literature, such as the case
of American racial neighbourhood covenants excluding African-Americans
from buying or renting housing in “white” neighbourhoods.65 It compares
closely to Jerusalem where the “fear of Arabness”, a term coined by Dahan-
Kalev,66 is a central mechanism of racialising the Other, i.e., representing
and defining Palestinians on the basis of racial categories that are used to
justify social biases and discrimination. With great significance for our case,
Balibar67 points to the new patterns of racism that are formed and organised
around sociological signifiers to replace biological markings. In other words,
the predominant factor in this form of racism is not the biological difference
between ethno-racial groups but rather the presence of minorities in urban
space, their movement through social and territorial boundaries, and the
perceptions, especially by the dominant majority groups, of these conditions.
However, beyond the social obstacles, as a lawyer who represents other
Palestinian families that purchase property in the French Hill, Antuan stated:
Arabs who buy here are economically stable, so they can buy every
apartment they are interested in. I personally know around twenty fam-
ilies who bought property . . . . If you look at these families – they are
each in a better economic situation than the average Israeli family. They
can afford ‘tosefet Aravi’.
The Hebrew term tosefet Aravi, used by Antuan, has also been repeated
by other interviewees. Literally meaning ‘an additional price for Arabs’,
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16 Haim Yacobi and Wendy Pullan
charged by Israeli vendors, it has become a common expression, cod-
ifying the sole access of Palestinians to the housing market in Jewish
neighbourhoods, while financially ensuring that Palestinian buyers offer 20 to
25 percent more for property in the neighbourhood. An estate agent who
lives and works in French Hill states:
The Arab buyers are offering better prices than the Israelis . . . it creates
a dilemma for the vendor. Some Jews will never sell their flats to Arabs,
they say ‘I’ll never do it to my neighbours’ but some others will. As a
property agent I will never do it.68
Indeed, contrary to the image of a backward or less worldly social group
as often presented in Israeli public discourse, Palestinian residents who are
economically able to buy property in French Hill are upper middle class and
often better educated than the average Israeli residents; many of them are
professionals or academics searching for a better housing environment, as
stated by Mustafa:
We were looking for an apartment . . . . We wanted a neighbourhood that
we liked, with good infrastructure. French Hill is a nice place to live; the
neighbours knew we are Arabs, they were nice . . . . All we want is to
live peacefully.69
But despite the fact that class and the modern western lifestyle of the
Palestinian inhabitants of French Hill are implicit conditions for their pres-
ence there, from the Jewish side it is just the beginning of a rapid slide to
losing demographic dominance in the neighbourhood. This dilemma, as sug-
gested by Rabinowitz70 accentuates the tension between the collective ethos
of Zionist territoriality and, what has become central to the Israel’s economy,
a capitalist mode of free housing market dynamics where personal economic
gain dominates. In the words of a Jewish resident,
In French Hill, especially in Ha-Etzel Street, the process [of Arabisation]
is rapid. The Arabs in our area are upper middle class. They come from
the North [of Israel] – one of them is a lawyer and following his arrival
another member of his family joined . . . . It starts with the arrival of good
people but I am afraid that during the years some negative elements will
also live here.71
In the end, housing does not necessarily make up all of the key features
of neighbourhood, and this is where hope for some further integration meets
a stumbling block. According to our findings, Palestinians in French Hill do
not partake in many local activities. They do not send their children to the
local, Hebrew-language school:
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Jerusalem’s Colonial Space Revisited 17
Initially we did not want to live in a neighbourhood which is entirely
Jewish since there is a problem with the education of our children . . .
when we decided to move to the French Hill we decided to send our
children to the Anglican School, though it is expensive and far away.72
Beyond that, Antuan echoes a common experience among Palestinians resid-
ing in French Hill who do not socialise with Jewish Israelis, and their use of
neighbourhood shops and services is minimal and curtailed. Mustafa notes:
We do our shopping in Shuafat, but once a week we go to the shopping
mall [in Pisgat Zeev]. We have no contact with the cultural events here,
the kids do not go to after-school activities here; the piano teacher is
coming to teach them here, at home; we take them to visit their [non-
Israeli] friends in other neighbourhoods. They have no reason to play
outside.
Palestinians may have moved to French Hill for better housing. But at any
meaningful level, they are not recognised as welcome residents of their
neighbourhood, cannot participate, through both their own reluctance and
Israeli distrust. This leaves them isolated, even caged, as a small minority in
an often unfriendly, sometimes hostile, environment.
THE POSSIBILITIES FOR PARTICIPATION
In French Hill, both rights and participation are key issues, and the
Palestinians fall short in both. Much has been said of the right to the city73 in
relation to the situation of Palestinian citizens in Israel74 and here we would
like to focus instead on the question of participation. This can take a variety
of forms; an extensive discussion of the pros and cons of participation is
beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is worth saying that we consider
it here primarily in terms of an urban culture with the necessary overtones
of political life that the situation in Jerusalem dictates.
Seyla Benhabib75 makes the important points that participation in a cul-
ture exists from within that culture, and although by nature it is shared, it
may also be contested. While clearly there is more than one culture living in
French Hill, we might question to what extent the place itself offers some cul-
tural parameters that, for Palestinians and Israelis, are in some ways shared
and certainly contested. To this, we might add that participation requires
some level of corporate activity or public life; it is not an individual act.
To understand how place may play a role in public participation, it
is worthwhile to see French Hill as a modern westernised neighbourhood
in the context of an older urban tradition of Middle Eastern cities. These
cities had quarters where different ethnic groups were not necessarily rigidly
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18 Haim Yacobi and Wendy Pullan
divided but nonetheless recognisable as such; the cities also had areas where
people mixed, mostly in market areas, including coffeehouses, baths, water
sources. They saw a variety of faces, heard different languages and accents,
and to some extent they discussed or argued about the matters of the day;
markets were political places. In the late Ottoman period, Jerusalem was a
more mixed city, and more nuanced in its ethnic strata.76
To good extent a local and customary order persisted in the city
although this was rarely comprehended by foreign (mostly western) trav-
ellers who, from the nineteenth century, describe the city has having four
quarters based upon religious divisions; Tamari77 argues that the confes-
sional city was primarily reinforced by the British after 1917. Whilst it would
be difficult to say that people had any more trust in or regard for the eth-
nically Other than they do today, the possibilities of participating in city life
were probably more institutionalised and embedded in the urban structures.
We can talk about a spectrum of space from segregation, as in mosques,
churches and synagogues, to integration, as in markets. In between, people
(men) frequented favourite cafes, where they met friends and acquaintances
and where they knew they were welcome, and avoided ones where they
felt uncomfortable. On the whole, they maintained neighbourly relations
that formed the basis of trade, patronage and more generally, everyday life.
In modern terminology, we could say that the city centre provided places
for mediating difference.
As we noted above, Israel has for the most part embraced mod-
ern planning and architecture which, as disciplines, have mostly neglected
such a mediative environment; at best, they have organised cities and
neighbourhoods in terms of functional typologies with little reflection of
the nuanced social structures that are common in the Middle East. At worst,
they have extended and reinforced the planning policies that separated peo-
ples on the basis of ethnic affiliation. Following in the footsteps of British
planning,78 the Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem have been designed as
autonomous enclaves, divided from Palestinian areas by valleys and bypass
roads rather than by urban places in which social and economic activity
might develop. If we look today at where there is some interaction between
Palestinians and Israelis, it often happens in the most mundane areas of life –
markets, petrol stations, some restaurants, or in French Hill, in the supermar-
ket, post office and bank.79 However these places are relatively few and
encounters tend to be fleeting.
With respect to the geopolitics of neighbourhoods, there is a clash of
scales, between everyday life and the big political picture. French Hill can
be said to some extent to be a microcosm of the Palestine-Israel conflict and
rather than the slow and undramatic ‘murmur of urban political discourse’
that Appadurai80 claims to commonly characterise the confluence of local
and global, Jerusalem’s high profile means that even the most innocuous of
actions are quickly thrust onto the world stage. At the same time, the lack
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Jerusalem’s Colonial Space Revisited 19
of balance between the everyday acts of Israelis and Palestinians reflects the
asymmetry of the larger political situation, and people who are caught up in
these circumstances are forced to live in a big but skewed picture. In short,
daily acts regularly become issues of sovereignty and, as Hannah Arendt81
has made clear, plurality and sovereignty do not mix.
One might ask to what extent living in French Hill is for its Palestinian
minority an act of resistance, in itself, a form of participation as a member
of one’s nation. For example, whilst many of the middle-class Palestinian
residents of French Hill see their residency as a ‘strategy of survival’, some
underline the political dimension of their decision to move to a colonial
neighbourhood:
. . . we broke the stereotypes against Arabs. They [the Jewish neighbours]
feel that we are part of this place . . . . If you will measure the socio-
economic ability of the Arabs in the neighbourhood, it is much higher
than the average Jewish people . . . . Our presence here has a symbolic
meaning, it is even a symbolic de-colonization.82
Whilst this may offer some satisfaction as an act of ongoing subversion,
at least at a symbolic level, the problem of everyday participation in one’s
neighbourhood and community is not solved. Rather, there is the question to
what extent Palestinians need to relinquish parts of their own culture in order
to achieve even a minimal level of integration. How compromised are they?
To buy or not to buy becomes an existential question. This seems to be most
important in the question of Palestinian polity; not only how much can they
participate in Israeli culture and institutions in French Hill, but to what extent
are they participating in their own culture and politics if they live in such
a neighbourhood? While they may enjoy some small level of acceptance
within Israeli circles in French Hill, this is fundamentally opposed to the
wishes of the larger Palestinian entity that desires the end of the occupation
and their own liberation. Arendt’s basic description of the polity of the polis
as ‘speaking and acting together’83 is mostly removed from the French Hill
Palestinians who live apart from the wider Palestinian collective. It is at this
fundamental level – not in the withholding of integration with Israelis, but
in their separation from Palestinian society – that participation is primarily
denied to them.
CONCLUSION
Ideally, the urban sphere, in its density and diversity, could serve as a space
that is “open to flows of people”.84 Such a liberal perspective relies heavily
on the belief that the city has the potential for the production of an “enabling
space” that might disrupt the existing hierarchies and boundaries of ethnic
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20 Haim Yacobi and Wendy Pullan
and class structures. Yet, as we have detailed, such a view is only partial in
the context of Jerusalem, which is divided not only along the Jewish/Arab
partition but also according to other ethnic divisions that stem from the
nature of the Israeli settler society.85
The most significant contribution of this article is that it looks not solely
at macro geopolitical processes namely occupation, colonisation and border-
ing but rather its analysis refers to facts on the ground from the point of view
of the ground. This complementary view of geopolitical processes reveals the
paradoxical situation of colonial territories such as French Hill. As we have
detailed, French Hill is both a well-established settlement, “normalised” by
different practices such as architecture and infrastructure planning, while at
the same time its frontier location on the old border makes it a space of nego-
tiation, unexpected migration and habitation. The ambivalence of contested
frontier and work-a-day suburb is typical of many Israeli settlements, but
French Hill is particularly vulnerable to such a strained dichotomy because
of the challenge to the homogeneous Jewish population by its Palestinian
residents.
Palestinians are a small minority in French Hill and likely to remain so
for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, their presence carries with it larger
implications and even some concrete benefits. The Palestinians do enjoy bet-
ter housing and municipal services; for some there is the sense of beating the
system, and for others, a form of resistance. The Israeli interests and concerns
are more difficult to pinpoint and many would argue that the phenomenon
is wholly negative; but at the risk of sounding patronising, it would be fair to
say that the Palestinian residents of French Hill are a small chink in the stone
of a politics-driven colonial planning system that is one-sided, unjust and
in need of reform; also important is that Israelis see Palestinians and hear
Arabic in a city where many segments of the population never encounter it.
But more to the point would be to look at the Palestinian residents in
the neighbourhood as it pertains to both groups: can we talk about shared
space in any way? After all, although multicultural cities today in the West
are seen as dealing with the other, particularly where destinies may exist
in tandem. To a small extent, public and commercial spaces in French Hill
are shared and at a minimal level, some experiences of the neighbourhood
become applicable to all. This is typical of many middle-class Western cities
where, in Bauman’s words, ‘strangers meet, remain in each other’s proximity,
and interact for a long time without stopping being strangers to each other’.86
At the same time, Jerusalem is a highly contested city and normal comments
on, and aspirations for, multiculturalism seems feeble here. The immigration
of ethnic and racial minorities to ‘white’ middle-class neighbourhoods is not
a peculiar Israeli phenomenon and has been covered widely in the literature;
however, the geopolitical discourse of inclusion and exclusion, borders and
boundaries, demographic control, security and separation attached to it ‘res-
onates with a long-standing discourse among the public as well as among
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Jerusalem’s Colonial Space Revisited 21
scholars and politicians who frame Israel as a regional ‘ghetto’ – which is
both ‘refuge’ and ‘island’’.87
As we have shown, such perceptions are produced by the politics
of enmity, fear and the geopolitical imagination of the neighbourhood as
exclusively Jewish-Israeli. Such conclusions are supported by a report of the
Israeli Institute of Democracy report88 that examines the extent of Jewish
Israelis’ tolerance for neighbours who are ‘other’ – including Palestinians,
foreign workers and gay couples among others; this survey reveals that
the neighbourly relationship considered most troubling is that with Arabs
(46 percent).
Two interrelated possibilities of sharing may be cited in the French
Hill example, possibilities which in themselves are powerful, although it is
too soon to understand their impact. First, both groups share the problem
of having their private lives regularly catapulted into the public realm and
world stage. Yet, both groups are middle class, educated and living relatively
conventional lives in this suburb of Jerusalem. This raises the second point:
in many ways these two groups are remarkably similar economically and
professionally if not politically. Ultimately, will such profound similarities
help to form a quiet if not friendly sharing of the neighbourhood? And, would
not a middle-class initiative, like establishing a joint Palestinian-Israel school
with instruction in Hebrew and Arabic, go a long way to easing tensions and
preparing the next generation for a certain amount of shared space? It is in a
neighbourhood like French Hill, with its middle-class populations, that such
schemes might bear fruit.
Although this research raises many questions at this point, it does make
clear that geopolitics in contested cities is happening at the minute and
everyday level. As we have discussed in this article, the geopolitics of cities
and the shaping of their territorial borders and social boundaries – both
externally (the city in relation to its region) and internally (between the
city’s neighbourhoods) – are determined not solely through military acts but
rather, as we suggested throughout this paper, urban geopolitics refers to
the emergence of discourses and forces attached to technologies of control,
in our case, planning. At the same time, patterns of migration such as the
case of Palestinians moving to French Hill and the flow of capital in the
housing free market are much more loosely related to formal structures, and
sometimes act as a controlling or unjust policy that has backfired.
As we have shown, geopolitical perspective is a useful analytical frame-
work for studying planning and the production of urban space that subverts
the traditional distinction between domestic and international affairs habitu-
ally taken for granted in political geography. We would also conclude that the
emergence of Palestinian inhabitants in Jerusalem’s colonial neighbourhoods
that were established after the 1967 war, mark new forms of urban dynam-
ics that form inclusion and exclusion as well as some new spatio-political
possibilities.
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22 Haim Yacobi and Wendy Pullan
Following Holston89 we can conclude that the city is a space in which
residents oppose and undermine dominant narratives of the state and capital.
Simultaneously, communities in the city create alternative local narratives that
do not necessarily reflect the rationale of the nation or of capital; nor do they
reflect the social hierarchy or the power relations that create it. As this article
shows, the production of urban space in colonial neighbourhoods cannot
be understood solely through the binary analysis of top-down processes
and policies. Rather, a deeper understanding demands acknowledging the
bottom-up initiatives and their role, as Lefebvre suggests that one can see
how a counter-space can insert itself into spatial reality “against the Eye
and the Gaze, against quantity and homogeneity, against power and the
arrogance of power”.90
At the contested boundaries of Jerusalem, it is not surprising to find
radical urban frontiers manufactured by planning apparatuses that as we
detailed, have dominated the city since 1967. But the frontier neighbourhood,
because of its ‘front line’ geographical location, enables, to some extent,
negotiation between Palestinian buyers and Jewish vendors, which in turn
cracks the demographic homogeneity dictated by the colonial project.
It would be wrong to attempt to idealise such instability; relying on the
possibilities offered by free-market housing through the ‘Tosefet Aravi’ as a
vehicle for achieving the right to the city is problematic, primarily because
it overlooks the promise of the city to be a space for neighbouring. In this
context we further conclude that neighbouring in its modern sense, with the
full possibilities and demands of participation in a neighbourhood, demands
equality, on both a legal and a practical level, which cannot be achieved
in present colonial conditions on one hand and in the context of growing
reliance on individuals’ socio-economic mobility on the other.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This article forms a part of the research of ‘Conflict in Cities and the Contested
State’, funded by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (RES-060-
25-0015), and the Marie Curie Intra-European Fellowship ‘Neighbouring and
the Geopolitics of Ethnically “Mixed Cities”’ (No: 252369). The authors are
grateful to Lefkos Kyriacou for preparing the illustrations.
NOTES
1. S. Kashua, from ‘Arab Labour’ chapter two screenplay 2010 (broadcast on channel 2, translated
by the authors). The authors are grateful to Sayed Keshua for the permission of using the screenplay.
2. Central Bureau of Statistics, Population Census (Jerusalem 2008).
3. T. Abowd, ‘National Boundaries, Colonized Spaces: The Gendered Politics of Residential Life in
Contemporary Jerusalem’, Anthropological Quarterly 80/4 (2007) p. 1025.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [2
17
.19
4.7
0.1
38
] a
t 1
0:5
7 1
3 M
ay
 20
14
 
Jerusalem’s Colonial Space Revisited 23
4. Interview, International Peace and Cooperation Centre, Jerusalem, Palestine, 20 July 2008.
5. The figures given in the introduction are confirmed by other sources. Out of approximately
7,000 inhabitants in French Hill there are around fifty Palestinian Arab families, mainly from Israel’s
northern region. Also, according to media reports there are 400 Palestinian families that moved to Jewish
neighbourhoods – mainly in French Hill, Pisgat Zeev and Neev Yaakov. For details see N. Hasson, ‘The
Palestinians in the French Hill Enjoy a High Life-Quality and Get Use to the Racism’, Haaretz, 24 July
2009.
6. M. LeVine, Overthrowing Geography: Jaffa, Tel-Aviv and the Struggle for Palestine 1880-1948
(Berkeley: University of California Press 2005); D. Monterescu and D. Rabinowitz (eds.), Mixed Towns,
Trapped Communities: Historical Narratives, Spatial Dynamics, Gender Relations and Cultural Encounters
in Palestinian-Israeli Towns (London: Ashgate 2007).
7. D. Rabinowitz, Overlooking Nazareth: The Ethnography of Exclusion in Galilee, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1997); H. Hamdan, ‘Upper Nazareth as a Mixed Town: Palestinian In-Migration
and Issues of Spatial Behavior’, in H. Yacobi and T. Fenster (eds.), Israeli City or City in Israel (Jerusalem:
Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Meuhad 2006) (in Hebrew).
8. For a detailed and critical discussion of the term “mixed” cities in Israel see H. Yacobi, The
Jewish-Arab City: Spatio-Politics in a Mixed Community (Routledge, London 2009)
9. C. R. Nagel, ‘Geopolitics by Another Name: Immigration and the Politics of Assimilation, Political
Geography 21/8 (2002) pp. 971–987.
10. D. Newman, ‘The Lines That Continue to Separate US: Borders in Our Borderless World’,
Progress in Human Geography 30/2 (2006) pp. 1–19.
11. S. Graham, ‘Cities and the ‘War on Terror’’, International Journal of Urban and Regional
Research 30/2 (2006) pp. 255–276; E. Weizman, Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation (London
and New York: Verso 2007).
12. J. Agnew and S. Corbridge, Mastering Space – Hegemony, Territory and International Political
Economy (London and New York: Routledge 1995).
13. See, for example: G. O’Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space
(Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press 1996); Agnew and Corbridge (note 12).
14. G. Dijkink and V. Mamadouh, ‘Territorial Arrangements and Geopolitics’, Tijdschrift voor
Economische en Sociale Geografie 97/3 (2006) pp. 207–208.
15. S. Graham, Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism (London and New York: Verso 2010).
16. Ibid., p. 379.
17. Z. Bauman, Liquid Fear (Cambridge: Polity Press 2006).
18. See, for example: Y. Jabareen, ‘The Politics of State Planning in Achieving Geopolitical Ends: The
Case of the Recent Master Plan for Jerusalem’, IDPR 32/1 (2010) pp. 27–43; O. Yiftachel and H, Yacobi,
‘Planning a Bi-National Capital: Should Jerusalem Remain United?’, Geoforum 33 (2002) pp. 137–145.
19. As developed in H. Gillette, Civitas by Design: Building Better Communities, from the Garden
City to the New Urbanism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2010).
20. Ibid., p. 2.
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